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Prolonging Life: The Duty and Its Limits 
John R. Connery, S.J. 
Father Connery, a noted moral theologian, is at Loyola University 
in Chicago. He is a member of the Linacre Quarterly editorial advisory 
board. 
The moral issue of prolonging life is frequently discussed today in 
the language of rights, more specifically in terms of a so-called right-
to-die. Since death is generally looked upon as something evil, those 
taking the rights approach find themselves in the somewhat anomalous 
position of defending a right to what is considered undesirable . They 
feel that they can do this reasonably because they can show that 
although death may be an evil, it is not the only evil, nor even the 
worst evil, and hence can conceivably be desirable, at least as a lesser 
evil. 
Since a substantial part of morality falls into the category of justice, 
there is no inherent reason for ruling out the use of rights language; it 
can apply just as validly to moral obligation as to legal obligation. But 
whatever may be said for the validity of this approach, it does not 
seem sufficiently basic to be satisfactory. Before one can speak in 
terms of any right-to-die, he has to consider the possibility of some 
obligation to life. If such an obligation exists, it would rule out, at 
least to the extent that it does, any possible righ t-to-die. Actually, it 
has been in terms of an obligation to preserve life that theologians 
have discussed the question since the early 15th century. Since in the 
present paper we are following this discussion, at least briefly, it is 
from this angle that the question will be considered. At the end of the 
paper, what has been said will be converted into rights language, to the 
extent that this is possible . 
Theologians have generally treated the duty to prolong life in the 
context of violations of human life, e.g., homicide and suicide. They 
have always held that respect for human life as a basic good demanded 
that no one deliberately destroy innocent human life, either his own 
or that of another. On this score they condemned so-called mercy 
killing. Even an otherwise good motive, such as mercy, could not 
justify taking innocent human life. But this was not all. Respect for 
human life also implied a duty to preserve life. This would mean an 
obligation at least to take ordinary food and drink as well as other 
common means of preserving or prolonging life. Failure here would be 
tantamount to suicide, at least if it were deliberate or due to neglect. 
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But since the early 15th century, theologians have explicitly admitted 
a limit to this duty to preserve life, a limit which they thought reason 
itself imposed. 
Before going into this question further, it might be well to distin-
guish it from a different, although related question - that of deter-
mining the time of death . There has been a tendency to confuse these 
two issues in recent discussions. A number of cases have come to 
public attention within the past few years where the basic question 
was whether the person was dead or alive . This is not the issue we are 
dealing with here. The assumption in the present discussion is that the 
person is still alive, and the issue is the obligation to keep him alive. In 
many cases where this question comes up, the fact that the person is 
still alive is quite clear. But there are cases in which this is not clear, at 
least initially, and in these cases confusion can arise. The problem can 
be illustrated by considering a practical decision to keep such a person 
on a respirator. The first question that would have to be answered is 
whether the patient is dead or alive . The criterion for determining the 
time of death would be operative in making this judgment. If it was 
judged that the patient was dead, one could turn off the respirator 
without further questioning. But if he was even probably alive, the 
person responsible would have to consider a possible obligation to 
prolong that life before he could turn off the respirator. The question 
we are dealing with here is not whether one may turn off the respir-
ator because the person is dead, but whether one may turn it off even 
though he is still alive. 
As already mentioned, theologians have always felt that man had 
some obligation to preserve or prolong life. At the same time, how-
ever, they maintained that there were limits to this obligation. It was 
limited, first, by the moral law itself; man could not do anything 
morally wrong even presuming that this would be necessary to pre-
serve his life. They maintained further that there were limits to the 
obligation to preserve life even apart from those imposed by morality. 
In other words, even if the use of a means was morally unobjectio-
nable, while it might be used, it was not always of obligation. 
Antoninus, a 15th century theologian (1389-1459), discussed the issue 
indirectly in terms of an obligation to obey a doctor. 1 Since the doc-
tor had no authority over the patient, Antoninus argued that the 
patient had no obligation to obey him. He added, however, that it 
might be imprudent to disobey the doctor because of his expertise. 
Thus, if a sick person either knowingly or out of crass ignorance were 
to eat or drink something that would bring on death, he would sin 
seriously. The sin could be less serious if what he took were merely to 
aggravate the illness. Although in either case it might not be a sin of 
disobedience it would be a violation of the patient's obligation to 
preserve his life, an obligation which the patient has apart from any 
relationship with a doctor. Antoninus goes on to say, somewhat 
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cryptically, that healthy people are not bound to live medicinaliter, 
since to the healthy, all things are healthy . The implication seems to 
be that healthy people do not have to be scrupulous about the food or 
drink they take. But he adds that even a healthy person would sin if 
he deliberately took something harmful to his health . Briefly, what he 
seems to be saying is that while one has an obligation to preserve his 
health, he should nevertheless be reasonable about it. 
A successor of Antoninus, Francisco de la Vitoria (d. 1546), also 
discusses the obligation to eat and drink to preserve his life.2 Contin-
uing what seems to have been the thought of Antoninus, he says that 
one is not obliged to use foods which are the best, the most expensive 
or the most exquisite. Neither is one bound to live in the healthiest 
climate. By way of example, he says that if a doctor advises a patient 
to eat chicken or partridge, he can eat eggs or other common dishes . 3 
Such advice would not be pertinent today since the prescribed foods 
are in no sense considered expensive delicacies, but it does clarify the 
distinction for those times. In speaking of the obligation to take medi-
cine, he comments that those who refuse to take some particular 
medicine are not to be condemned since one can rarely be certain that 
it will work. 4 Again, he is speaking of a time when little was known 
about the chemical properties or effectiveness of drugs, so one would 
have to modify his statement today. Vitoria himself goes on to say 
that if one is certain that a drug will save his life, or that without it he 
will die, he will mortally sin by not taking it . But even an effective 
drug would not be obligatory if one had to continue to take it over a 
long period of time. 
The first author to take up the question of surgery was Domingo 
Soto (1494-1560), a Dominican of the early 16th century.5 He asks 
whether one is bound to undergo amputation of an arm or leg to 
preserve or prolong life. His answer is that no one could force a 
patient to undergo such torture. He is speaking, of course, of surgery 
at a time when anesthesia was not available. Again, one would not 
make the same judgment today , at least not for the same reason . 
Distinction Between Ordinary/Extraordinary Means 
Seventeenth century theologians formulated the obligation to pre-
serve life and its limits in terms of a distinction between ordinary or 
common means and ex traordinary m eans. 6 According to this distinc-
tion one would be obliged to use ordinary means to preserve life, but 
in general would not be obliged to use extraordinary means. The 
distinction was based on the burden the use of some means would 
place on the patient (or on others). If the burden was too heavy for 
the patient to carry , the means would have to be considered extra-
ordinary, and therefore non-obligatory . The general norm for gauging 
May, 1980 153 
the burden was the reaction of the common man, although the sensi-
tivities of the individual were also taken into account. Thus, theo-
logians admitted that the fear or embarrassment of some women of an 
examination by a male doctor might make such an examination an 
extraordinary means. If a female doctor were available, an examina-
tion would generally be considered ordinary means. In assessing any 
particular means, it made no difference whether the burden to the 
patient was experienced before, during or after the treatment. The 
need for extensive travel, for instance, could make a treatment extra-
ordinary even before use. In the amputation case discussed by Soto, 
the burden was experienced during the procedure. It could happen, 
however, that the burden would not be experienced until after the use 
of the means. In today's society, for example, a quadruple amputation 
might not be the painful experience it was in the 16th century, but it 
could certainly make life burdensome for its victim afterwards ; this in 
itself would make it an extraordinary procedure. So if a particular 
means imposed a great burden on the patient either before, during or 
after its use, it would not be obligatory. The burden could take the 
form of great pain, physical or mental hardship, danger or even 
expense. 
Some today are a little reluctant to accept great expense as an 
excusing reason for omitting some treatment. To them it is somewhat 
venal to attach more value to money than to health . There is some-
thing to be said for this attitude, but one must remember that what is 
sacrificed is usually not just money, but other things that money 
could buy - things that might be just as valuable as health . Or one 
might be incurring crippling debts that could make life very difficult. 
It is essential to point out at this time that the distinction between 
ordinary and extraordinary means as used by the theologian does not 
mean at all the same thing it means as when used by a physician. To 
the physician ordinary means are routine means; whatever procedure 
is customary or usual in a particular case is considered ordinary. It is 
the relation of the means to medical practice that makes it ordinary; it 
has nothing to do with the burden imposed on the patient . It might 
well be that the two concepts would coincide, so that a treatment that 
was routine from the medical viewpoint would be ordinary from the 
moral standpoint, at least in the sense that it was easily available. But 
they are in no way coextensive. A procedure that might be considered 
ordinary or routine medically speaking could be very extraordinary 
from the viewpoint of the burden it places on the patient. An example 
of this might be the treatment for kidney failure called hemodialysis. 
The medical profession would consider this ordinary treatment for 
kidney shutdown. But if the kidneys were shut down permanently, 
hemodialysis could easily become very burdensome to the patient, 
particularly an elderly patient. In a counseling situation, one might 
urge a patient to put up with the burden for the benefit of prolonging 
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life. But one could not impose a moral duty on a patient to carry such 
a heavy burden. The basis of the moral distinction between ordinary 
and extraordinary means reinforces the reason why the option belongs 
to the patient rather than the doctor. Only the patient can gauge the 
burden he experiences. The doctor may be in the best position to 
judge what is "ordinary" treatment from the medical viewpoint, but 
he is not the best qualified to judge the burden to the patient, which is 
the decisive factor in the moral distinction. 
Use of the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means 
was not limited to terminal cases. Even if the use of a particular means 
would prolong life indefinitely (e.g., amputation, hemodialysis), if it 
imposed too much of a burden on the patient, it would not be con-
sidered obligatory. So the decisive factor was not benefit to the 
patient, but the burden involved. Theologians, however, did use 
another distinction in dealing with the duty to preserve life and placed 
a limitation on the obligation to use even ordinary means. This distinc-
tion centered around the benefit to the patient, that is, whether the 
means was helpful or useless . The norm was an obvious one: no one 
can be obliged to employ useless means. The general principle is 
broader than the problem of prolonging life, but these theologians 
were applying it only to this context. Judging from the examples they 
gave, one can also conclude that they were speaking of cases where 
people were dying. If a person were going to die in the immediate 
future and there was no real hope that the uses of a particular means 
would prolong his life except, perhaps, minimally, it would be con-
sidered useless, and therefore not obligatory, even if it were otherwise 
ordinary. A 17th century theologian illustrated this point by the 
example of one being burned at the stake. 7 If water was easily avail-
able, but not enough to put out the fire, the victim would not be 
obliged to use it. Death was imminent whether he used it or not, so it 
would offer no real benefit; it would merely prolong the agony of 
dying. Another case offered by way of example was that of a person 
starving to death who had only one meal available. Since one meal 
would not make an appreciable difference in delaying death, it could 
not be consid~red obligatory means. This limitation of the obligation 
to use ordinary means is especially important in terminal cases, where 
death is imminent whether they are used or not. 
Many theologians today classify means that offer no appreciable 
benefit in prolonging life as extraordinary, subsuming the distinction 
between useful /useless means under the definition of ordinary /extra-
ordinary means. In more recent times, this has caused some confusion. 
My own preference is to teep them separate, and I have already hinted 
at the reason for this. They deal with different issues - burden and 
benefit - and usually apply to different types of cases . In practice, at 
least, the question of benefit seems limited largely to terminal cases; 
burden can be an issue even in cases which are not terminal. 
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Whether medical procedures will be classified as ordinary or extra-
ordinary by the theologian will vary according to time and place. As 
already mentioned, simple amputations were considered extraordinary 
means because of the pain involved. Where anesthesia is available, 
however, surgery would not be considered extraordinary, at least by 
reason of the pain suffered. Similarly, such procedures as giving 
oxygen, IV feeding, blood transfusions, might have been considered 
extraordinary means 50 or a hundred years ago. Today they could 
hardly be considered such, except perhaps in some part of the globe 
where they are not easily available. Similarly, although procedures of 
this kind would not be classified as extraordinary on a short term 
basis, e.g., to pull a patient through a crisis, if they had to become a 
way of life, even today they would fall into this class. e.g., long term 
or permanent use of an artificial respirator. The burden of such use 
could make them intolerable. 
It might be well to point out at this juncture that the traditional 
approach to the moral obligation to prolong life allows broader 
options than recent legislation in California, and some proposed legis-
lation in other states, would permit. The California statute, for 
instance, legalizes the option not to use "extraordinary" means only 
in terminal cases. 8 Converting this into the language we have been 
using, one would say that the legislation covers primarily those means 
which would not make any appreciable difference in prolonging life, 
since death is imminent whether the means are used or not. It does 
not cover those cases where the use of the means would prolong the 
life of the patient indefinitely, but would put too much of a burden 
on the patient to make them obligatory. It would not cover, for 
instance, the Quinlan case. Even if the girl had made the "living will" 
called for in the statute, it would have had no force in her case since it 
was never considered terminal. And even in a terminal case, the legisla-
tion makes no allowance for a proxy decision where the patient is 
comatose but has made no "living will." It would indeed be unfor-
tunate if such legislation prejudiced rather than protected the moral 
right uf a patient either to forego the use of extraordinary means or to 
discontinue them. 
Basic Duty Belongs to Person 
The basic duty to preserve or prolong life belongs to the person 
himself. The same is true of the option to use extraordinary means. It 
is up to the person himself to use or forego the use of such means. 
This offers no problem when an individual is on his own, but if he is in 
a patient-doctor relationship, a conflict can arise. The doctor may 
want to use means that go beyond both the obligation and the wishes 
of the patient. Even in this relationship the decision belongs to and 
remains with the patient. The doctor has only those rights over the 
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patient which the patient gives him. If the patient, therefore, decides 
not to use extraordinary means, the doctor has no right to impose 
them on him, and if he does, he is violating the rights of the patient.9 
Once the principle has been set down, it must be admitted that it is 
not always easy to determine the real wishes of the patient, especially 
in difficult cases. This is very clearly illustrated in a case described 
recently in the Hastings Center Report. 10 The patient involved, a 
young man, suffered second and third degree burns over most of his 
body. Both eyes were blinded by corneal damage, his ears were mostly 
destroyed, and he suffered severe burns to his face, upper extremities, 
body and legs. The patient constantly and consistently resisted the 
very painful treatment he had to undergo, and pleaded with the doc-
tors to let him die. But despite his repeated protests, the doctors 
continued to treat him for many months. Eventually, however, they 
gave in to his pleas and agreed that if he did not want any further 
treatment they would not force it on him. When that happened, the 
young man withdrew his resistance and agreed to go along with the 
treatment. One would have to conclude that in this case it would have 
been a mistake for the doctors to have accepted his original plea 
literally. The ultimate outcome seemed to indicate that all the young 
man wanted was a voice in his own treatment. Once this was granted, 
he was satisfied. He really did not want to die. The case illustrates very 
poignantly the difficulty of interpreting the requests of a person who 
is in great pain. It seems obvious that mistakes cannot be entirely 
eliminated in interpreting the patient 's real wishes in these cases. The 
most one can hope for is to keep them to a minimum . What is essen-
tial for doctors is to keep in mind that the decision to use or forego 
extraordinary means is not their own decision. It must always be a 
justifiable interpretation of the real wishes of the patient. 
If the patient is comatose or incompetent, it is up to a responsible 
relative to make the decision for him. This may be the only way a 
patient can exercise his right either to ask for extraordinary means or 
to forego them. The obligation of the proxy, then, is to make the 
decision the patient would make if he were able. If he has no way of 
knowing this; his best option is to make the decision he would make if 
he were in the patient's place, or the decision that reasonable people 
would make for themselves in that situation. Mistakes may be made, 
but this procedure should keep them to a minimum. What must be 
kept in mind is that the proxy does not have the freedom the patient 
himself has regarding extraordinary means . His obligation is not based 
on the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means . but on 
the wishes of the patient. If he were to decide against extraordinary 
means in a situation where the patient would want them, he is doing 
wrong. Too often in recent times ethicians have assumed that the 
proxy has the same freedom the patient himself has to forego extra-
ordinary means. 
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It is one thing to discuss the obligation to use means to preserve life 
of a patient; it is quite another to discuss the obligation of others to 
provide such means to a patient. Again, recent writing on this subject 
has oversimplified this obligation by reducing it to the distinction 
between providing ordinary and extraordinary means. The impression 
is left that the obligation to provide means, like the obligation to use 
means, depends on the nature of the means : if the means are ordinary, 
there is an obligation to provide them; if they are extraordinary, there 
is no obligation. The obligation to provide means is much more 
nuanced than that. The nature of this obligation will differ according 
to the relation of the person providing the means to the patient. If 
that person is the patient's doctor, he will have an obligation in justice 
to supply whatever means the patient reasonably requests. Because of 
their special relationship, parents will also have a special obligation to 
provide for the needs of their children. Others will have an obligation 
in charity to provide means to preserve life if the patient is in need of 
t heir help. Although these obligations are graded according to the 
relationship with the patient, none of them are absolute. In deter-
mining the limits of the obligation, another factor must be taken into 
consideration: the hardship to the donor or provider. No one, for 
instance, would be obliged to sacrifice his life to supply a patient's 
need. If someone were drowning and an attempt to save him would 
involve serious risk to my own life, while it might be a heroic thing 
to do, I would not be obliged to risk my life to save him . This would 
be true even of providing ordinary means. I would not be obliged to 
give food necessary to preserve my own life to a starving man, 
although food is generally classified as ordinary m eans. On the other 
hand, if a patient wishes extraordinary means , and cannot supply 
them otherwise, even a stranger might have an obligation to provide 
them if he could easily do so without serious inconvenience. And the 
obligation of the doctor or parent would be even more binding. So the 
obligation to provide means necessary to preserve life cannot be 
reduced to the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means. 
It is determined by the wishes of the patient in need and my ability to 
relieve that need without serious hardship. 
Obligation to Help 
It should be noted at this time that the obligation to help another, 
whether of the doctor or the parent, or even of a stranger, goes 
beyond merely providing means to preserve life. A patient may have 
other needs, and these may continue to call for help even when the 
obligation to preserve life ceases. Paul Ramsey calls attention to this 
fact when he speaks of the obligation of "only caring" for the 
dying. 11 The only criticism I would have of his treatment is that one 
easily gets the impression from it that this latter obligation begins 
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when the obligation to preserve life ceases. Actually, the obligation to 
help others in need is a general obligation that extends through life. A 
person may have many other needs throughout his lifetime for which he 
himself cannot provide. The obligation of charity extends to any need 
the person himself cannot relieve. It continues even after the obligation 
to preserve life and the need for assistance in this regard has ceased. One 
does not simply wheel a patient, at either end of life, into a corner and 
leave him there because it has been decided that the obligation to 
preserve his or her life has ceased. As long as he is alive (and even 
after), the obligation of charity will continue to call for relief of 
whatever other needs he or she may still have. 
An equally important question is whether the obligation to provide 
means to preserve the life of another will cease apart from the pres-
ence of serious hardship to the provider. The assumption is that ordin-
ary means are needed or extraordinary means have been requested 
either by the patient or his proxy. Could a person who was easily able 
to provide such means legitimately refuse to do so? There are 
instances in which this would clearly be wrong. For example, if a man 
were drowning and I could easily save him, it would be wrong to refuse 
help because he was black. But what if he were seriously defective or 
handicapped? I do not think that a decision not to save the seriously 
defective person would necessarily involve discrimination. Thus, if one 
had to make a choice between saving a healthy child and a defective 
one, I think a legitimate choice could be made of the healthy child, 
unless the lifesaver was the parent (or the doctor) of the defective 
child. It should be remarked, however, that there seems to be consid-
erable agreement that in general when not all can be saved, a random 
selection is the most just. If the decision had to do only with saving or 
not saving the defective child, I suspect that most people would feel 
very guilty about letting a defective child drown when they could 
easily save him. But when there is a question of letting a defective 
child die in a hospital, although the reality of refusing help is the 
same, it does not appear as stark, since death is not immediate. 
As there is no evidence to show that defective people put an end to 
their lives mor.e frequently than normal people, there is no reason for 
thinking that they consider death preferable to continued existence 
with their handicap.12 If this is true, it is hard to understand how 
refusing help on the basis of quality-of-life estimate is generally con-
sistent with the duty of charity; it would be dooming many handi-
capped people to what they would consider a lesser good. There may 
be a rare case where predictable quality-of-life would be so low that 
the life itself could not be classified as human, but this would be a rare 
exception and the prediction would be extremely difficult to make. 
Charity, moreover, would demand that the benefit of any doubt be 
given the defective person. 
It would be impossible in this paper to go into all the nuances of 
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the obligation to provide help to people in dying situations. The pur-
pose here has been chiefly to introduce the distinctions that should be 
made between the obligation of a person faced with a decision about 
prolonging life, the obligation of a proxy who has to make a decision 
for an incompetent, and that of a person whose help is needed to save 
another person's life. These are all related obligations, but they are 
also different. It is the judgment of the present writer that in recent 
writing they have been bunched together without adequate distinc-
tion. Each obligation has its own norms, and although they are related 
to the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means, they 
cannot simply be reduced to it. 
One hears rumblings today against the distinction between ordinary 
and extraordinary means. Robert Veatch wants to substitute the term 
" reasonable" in discussing the obligation to preserve life; one would 
not be obliged to use means if it were reasonable (to the patient, if he 
were competent, or to a reasonable man, if the patient were not compe-
tent) to refuse them. 13 Since his reasonable /unreasonable distinction 
involves both the notion of usefulness and that of burden discussed 
above, he is not really departing very far from the traditional prin-
ciples set down above. It is only the terminology that he would like to 
change. I am not sure that the change accomplishes any great clarifica-
tion. but I would have no objection to it as long as one does not 
conclude from the fact that it would be reasonable to turn down a 
particular means that it would be unreasonable to use . This might be 
true of a useless means, but not necessarily of a means that was 
burdensome. If the patient wishes to accept the burden, it would be 
perfectly reasonable to use such means. This moral option should not 
be taken from him or frowned on as unreasonable. 
Ramsey Considers Distinction Outdated 
Paul Ramsey would also like to bury the distinction between ordin-
ary and extraordinary means. 14 He considers the distinction not only 
outdated but actually harmful. His chief grievance seems to be with 
the use of the distinction in the case of the non-dying incompetent 
patient. It is his contention that the distinction brings in a quality-of-
life dimension that should not be a consideration in these cases. 15 
Ramsey himself substitutes, at least in the case of the incompetent 
patient, a medical indications norm. According to this norm, if a 
treatment is medically indicated, it is obligatory; if it is not, it would 
not be obligatory. Thus, if the patient were terminal, and treatment 
would be useless, it would not be m edical ly indicated and hence not 
obligatory. If the patient were not dying, and the treatment were not 
medically indicated because it would not help and might even harm 
the patient, it would not be obligatory. If it were medically indicated 
because it would help the patient, it would be obligatory. The virtue 
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of this position is that it puts the emphasis on the effectiveness of the 
means rather than on the quality of the patient's life. 16 
There is much to be said in favor of this approach. This is dramatic-
ally illustrated in Ramsey's own book by the examples he offers of 
abuse of the quality-of-life norm. But it has this drawback. The tradi-
tional distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means was 
meant to show that other considerations could outweigh medical indi-
cations in dealing with the duty to prolong life. More precisely, the 
burden of using certain means to prolong life could be such that one 
could not reasonably make them obligatory . It is true that in the past 
theologians were speaking of decisions made by competents. But is it 
reasonable to make incompetent people bear burdens that competent 
people do not have to bear? Certainly, the decision is more difficult to 
make in the case of incompetents, but the difficulty does not warrant 
retreat to a position which seems to compromise the rights of the 
incompetent. Ramsey seems to be canonizing medical indications, at 
least in the case of incompetents. I would tend to agree with him in 
his concern about the dangers of quality-of-life considerations, but I 
do not agree that in order to avoid them we should or have to make 
medical decisions final. 
From what has been said earlier in the paper, it should be clear that 
I agree with Ramsey's position that the norm for a proxy decision is 
not the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means, but 
the wishes of the patient. In the case of infants, of course, it is impos-
sible to know these wishes, but even in these cases one cannot simply 
fall back on this distinction, and forego extraordinary means. I have 
no hard statistics, but I think it can be said that competent people 
choose to use extraordinary means far more frequently than they 
forego them. If one cannot know the wishes of an incompetent, he 
may be able at least to approximate them by trying to discern what 
competent people would decide if they were in such circumstances. 
What I am trying to say is that the rights of an incompetent person 
should be respected as much as those of the competent. He should 
have the same right to bear a burden or to forego one, and it should 
not simply be assumed that because he is incompetent, especially if he 
is defective, only ordinary means are in order. 
Some attention must be given to another dimension of this prob-
lem: the duty of the doctor to his profession. Does this demand that 
he continue to fight disease with all means available? Is he not failing 
in his duty if he foregoes the use of some means, even with the 
consent of the patient? If the doctor were fighting disease in a test-
tube, or perhaps even in an experimental animal, there would be no 
limit to what he could do, except for the dimensions of his own 
resources. But the doctor who is fighting disease in a human patient 
must respect that person and his legitimate wishes. His professional 
position gives him no right to override the wishes of the patient. The 
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medical profession is for the good of the patient; the patient is not the 
tool of the profession. A doctor who would, out of his duty to his 
profession, impose the use of extraordinary means on the patient 
against his legitimate wishes would be subordinating his patient to the 
profession, and to that extent, abusing him. 
It is quite conceivable that a conscience conflict would arise 
between doctor and patient regarding the use of some treatment or 
therapy. If the doctor cannot persuade the patient to accept the treat-
ment which his conscience demands he give him, his only alternative is 
to bow out of the case. This will allow the patient to employ the 
services of a doctor whose conscience is not at odds with the wishes of 
the patient. Unfortunately, this is more easily said than done, espe-
cially if the patient is in a hospital and a proxy decision is made by 
close relatives. It is well known that an impasse of this kind was 
reached in the recent Quinlan case, which subsequently had to be 
taken to the courts for settlement. There may have been no alternative 
to a court solution in the Quinlan case, but it is certainly regrettable 
to have to go to the courts to settle a conscience problem. Perhaps it 
might have been unnecessary if the conscience problem had not been 
complicated by fear of a malpractice or even a criminal charge. 
Decision Often Left to Doctor 
Even though the option belongs to the patient, it must be admitted 
that patients will often leave the decision to use extraordinary means 
up to the doctor. Since the decision frequently involves medical judg-
ment and the doctor knows more about medicine than the patient, the 
latter will often confide in his judgment. Also, even when the patient 
makes the decision himself, what he decides will often depend on how 
the doctor presents the case to him. What is the obligation of the 
doctor in these cases? Even here it seems clear that the interests of the 
patient rather than those of the profession would dictate the judgment 
or decision of the doctor. In the therapeutic relationship, the first 
duty of the doctor, even as a professional man, is to the patient and 
his wishes. If he gives priority to professional interests, he is really 
making the patient a research subject, and without the patient's 
explicit consent, would be abusing him to that extent. 
One sometimes hears the charge that the doctor (or the patient) 
who foregoes extraordinary measures is "playing God." God is the 
Author of life and death, and the decision to terminate life should be 
left to Him. In responding to this charge, one cannot of course deny 
that God is the author of life and death, but this does not imply that 
man must use all possible means to postpone death. As a matter of 
fact, he would seem to be more open to the accusation of usurping a 
divine prerogative by prolonging life than by not prolonging it. So one 
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cannot conclude from God's authorship of life that it would be wrong 
to forego extraordinary means (much less useless means). This would 
be wrong only if man knew his appointed time and then anticipated it. 
No one can claim such knowledge . 
In a similar vein some will argue that since a miracle is always 
possible, a doctor must continue to use all means to keep a patient 
alive. It is hard to see how one could establish a duty on the part of a 
doctor to gear his practice to the possibility of a miracle. In fact, it is 
not even clear how he would or could do this. Presumably, God can 
work a miracle anytime He wants. And He is just as capable of bring-
ing a person back from death as He is of bringing him back from a 
terminal illness. Keeping a person alive can hardly be a necessary 
condition for a miracle. So it is not clear how the possibility of a 
miracle provides any argument for an obligation to use extraordinary 
means. 
In the present controversy over prolonging life, some have claimed 
that once extraordinary means have been initiated, there is an obliga-
tion to continue them. They have argued, for instance, that although 
there may have been no duty initially to put a patient on a respirator, 
once this has been done, there is a duty to continue its use. There is 
really no justification for this stand. If means are truly extraordinary, 
there is no more obligation to continue them than there was to initiate 
them. One does not create an obligation by the mere fact of initiating 
extraordinary means. Actually, even in a case where the means were 
judged ordinary when initiated, any obligation to continue them 
would cease if for some reason they became extraordinary. There is 
even less reason for obligatory continuation of means which were 
extraordinary from the beginning. 
At least partially connected with the above problem are the mis-
givings of some about terminating the use of extraordinary means by 
acts of commission rather than omission. There are those who have no 
difficulty about acts of omission but who see in acts of commission, 
euthanasia or mercy killing. While they would not scruple about not 
putting a patient on a respirator, they tend to identify " pulling the 
plug" with direct killing. Their problem is really more psychological 
than moral. Not all positive acts taken by physicians involve the taking 
of human life; they do so only if they actually cause the patient's 
death. There is an important difference between injecting an air 
bubble in a patient's bloodstream and turning off a respirator. The air 
bubble really causes the person's death. If the respirator is turned off, 
the cause of the patient's death is the very cause that would have 
brought it on if the respirator had never been used. If the use of the 
respirator had to be considered an ordinary means of preserving life, 
turning it off woulcl still be wrong, but granted that it is an extra-
ordinary means, turning it off in no way involves either direct killing 
or culpable neglect. 
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We are in a position now to convert what we have been saying into 
the so-called language of rights. But I would have to preface what I 
have to say with the protest that I do not like the expression right-to-
die. It says much more than I want to say or think should be said, and 
so is misleading. In other words, I think that it has legitimate meaning 
only within very prescribed limits. No one has a right-to-die in the 
sense that he may take his own life or authorize someone else to do 
the same, much less impose on him a corresponding obligation. If 
there were a positive right-to-die it would imply all this. I doubt that 
anyone holds a right-to-die in this sense. Nor does one have a right-to-
die in the sense that he may omit the use of ordinary means to pre-
serve life, or authorize (or even oblige) someone else to withhold such 
means. In other words, active euthanasia has never been acceptable, 
and the same is true of passive euthanasia, at least in the sense that the 
latter would allow the omission of ordinary means. The only right a 
patient has - and this is a real right - is not to use extraordinary 
means to prolong life, and a consequent right not to be forced to use 
such means . This implies a corresponding obligation on others not to 
force such means on him . Within these limits, and only within them, 
does the right-to-die have meaning. 
In concluding this article, I should explain that the intention here 
was to present and explain the traditional position on the obligation 
to prolong life and its limits. It was felt that there was need of such a 
presentation because of the many misinterpretations and misunder-
standings current about this position . There was no intention of pre-
senting newer positions as such but only insofar as they implied a 
misunderstanding of the traditional position. The article, as a conse-
quence, has its built-in limitations. It was not meant to be a catalog or 
critique of recent opinions on the duty to prolong life. These opinions 
may make for interesting debate, but it was not the purpose of this 
article to contribute to this debate. The purpose here was simply to 
show that the traditional position, if properly understood, is still a 
viable one. 
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